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STUDENT COMMENTS
AUTONOMOUS ADOLESCENTS, SEXUAL
RESPONSIBILITY, RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS,
AND CONGRESS: AN ILLICIT CHURCH/STATE
RELATIONSHIP?
EUGENE F. ASSAF*
The right of the child to be educated requires that the edu-
cator shall have moral authority over him, and this author-
ity is nothing else than the duty of the adult to the freedom
of the youth'
INTRODUCTION
The thought of needy youngsters evokes deep concerns
and calls for humane assistance.' Traditionally, many reli-
gious and charitable groups have heeded these calls and of-
fered guidance and instruction to otherwise dispossessed
youth.' Despite the demonstrable good achieved by religious
* B.A. 1984, Dickinson College; M.A. 1987, University of Essex; J.D.
1989, University of Notre Dame; Thomas J. White Scholar, 1987-1989.
1. J. MARITAIN, EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS 33 (1943).
2. See generally Wallis, Children Having Children, TIME, Dec. 9, 1985,
at 78; Kosterlizt, Split Over Pregnancy, NATIONAL JOURNAL, June 21, 1986 at
1538 (reporting the high incidence of teenage pregnancy, especially among
lower socio-economic groups); ALAN GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, 11 MILLION
TEENAGERS: WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT THE EPIDEMIC OF ADOLESCENT
PREGNANCIES IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (1976) (reporting that over one mil-
lion youngsters, aged 15 to 19, become pregnant every year; single women
have most of these pregnancies).
For other social problems that have an impact on the teenage pregnancy
problem and are impacted by teenage pregnancy, see J. KoZOL, DEATH AT
AN EARLY AGE (1974) (describing the lack of educational opportunities for
inner-city children); J. KOZOL, ILLITERATE AMERICA (1986) (reporting the
prevalence of illiteracy in America); J. KOZOL, RACHEL AND HER CHILDREN
(1987) (relating the plight of children who are homeless).
3. For Congressional commentary on the instrumental role of reli-
gious groups in providing social welfare to the poor, see the text and ac-
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and charitable groups in providing such care, some have
voiced concerns that such a relationship, if state-funded, con-
stitutes an unconstitutional establishment of religion.' Natu-
rally, both the religious groups who seek to aid the disadvan-
taged youngsters and those who endeavor to bar such aid on
establishment clause grounds profess concern both for the
supremacy of the Constitution and the dignity of the
adolescents.
Endeavoring to reconcile these concerns, in 1981 the
Congress, in a bipartisan measure, moved to combat the epi-
demic proportions of teenage pregnancy by enacting a law to
encourage sexual responsibility among adolescents. The Ado-
lescent Family Life Act (AFLA) dispersed funds to private or-
ganizations,5 including religious and charitable groups, who
through counseling and teaching promote self-discipline and
adoption instead of permissiveness and abortion.
In Kendrick v. Bowen,' Judge Charles Ritchie found that
AFLA,' on its face and as applied to "religious organiza-
tions," violated the first amendment of the United States
Constitution." The Supreme Court heard the case and has
companying legislative history of the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assis-
tance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-77, 101 Stat. 482 (1987) (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 11301-11472 (1987)).
For scholarly commentary on the role of religious groups in providing
social welfare programs, see Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment,
and Doctrinal Development Part II: The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV.
L. REV. 513 (1968).
4. See generally Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373
(1985); L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM (1953); L. PFEFFER, RELI-
GION, STATE AND THE BURGER COURT (1986).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 300z (1982).
AFLA is not simply part of the Reagan administration's conservative so-
cial agenda that provides $15 million to religious groups only, as one news-
paper reported. Washington Legal Times, June 1, 1987, at 4.
AFLA is part of an agenda that seeks to stop poor, single, uneducated
children from having children. It is representative of the federal govern-
ment's efforts of using local groups of social workers to educate these
children.
Senator Edward Kennedy remarked that AFLA helps to stem "a sad and
unnecessary waste of priceless human potential. . . .This bill would per-
mit our communities to continue the good work that we have already be-
gun." S.Rep. No. 97-161, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1987), Additional
Views of Senator Edward M. Kennedy.
6. 657 F. Supp. 1547 (D.D.C. 1987).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 300z [Supp. III] (1981).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The entire amendment reads, "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; of abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
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rendered a decision.9 The narrow issue decided by the Court
was whether the State can use religious organizations to
counsel and teach sexual responsibility without violating the
establishment clause. Beyond this, the case offered the Court
an opportunity to reveal its view of adolescents in educational
settings.10
Constitutional decisions about adolescents are difficult,
and that difficulty is reflected in United States Supreme
Court cases that alternately treat them as children in some
contexts and as young adults in others. It might shed some
light on this pattern of treatment if one thinks of very young
children as possessing primary autonomy11 and adolescents as
possessing an intermediate level of autonomy. The Court's
decisions have consistently recognized these two classes of
maturity for youngsters. For example, in establishment clause
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
government for a redress of grievances."
Plaintiffs, a group of citizen taxpayers, Protestant clergymen, and the
American Jewish Congress, sought injunctive relief from AFLA on
grounds that the government violated the first amendment. The defend-
ants, Otis Bowen through and by the United States Department of Health
and Human Services, opposed the basis of the claim and the relief sought.
The parties stipulated most of the facts and provided exhaustive data on
the workings of the particular grantee and subgrantee at issue. With no
material fact in dispute Judge Ritchie treated both parties' 12(c) motions as
motions for summary judgment.
Judge Ritchie, relying on recent Supreme Court decisions, granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The Court thus granted the plain-
tiffs' injunction against funding to "religious organizations under AFLA,
that AFLA on its face and applied violates the first amendment" only inso-
far as "religious organizations are involved in carrying out the programs
and purposes of the act." Chief Justice Rehnquist, sitting as Circuit Judge,
stayed the District Court's order, thus allowing the statute to continue until
further review. In doing so he noted probable jurisdiction.
9. The case was decided on June 29, 1988. 108 S.Ct. 2562 (1988).
10. Of course one might question the rationale of analogizing AFLA
counseling centers to schools. But, given the break from traditional educa-
tional settings and the establishment of institutions other than schools, it
appears that much of the nation's education will occur in non-traditional
fora. The use of AFLA organizations to education and to perform the role
of the schools comports with effective State education through mediating
structures, such as private groups. See generally B. Hafen, Institutional Au-
tonomy in Public, Private, and Church-related Schools, 3 NOTRE DAME J. L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 405 (1988).
11. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 17 and accompanying text. These two classes of
autonomy stand in contrast to the complete autonomy that the law imputes
to adults. This idea of complete autonomy is something of a fiction in
moral philosophy.
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challenges to State funding of religiously-affiliated secondary
schools, the Court has generally seen adolescents as lacking
maturity and sophistication, thus making them susceptible to
indoctrination and coercion.13 Conversely, in cases dealing
with a minor's decision to undergo an abortion " and in cases
evaluating state funding of sectarian colleges, 5 the Court has
characterized the adolescent as possessing enough responsi-
bility and sensibility so as to make informed, uncoerced
choices. Until Kendrick no single case has carefully probed
the significance of these characterizations, or what may be
termed a "double standard.""
13. E.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 472 U.S. 402 (1985); Grand Rapids
School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971).
14. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52 (1976); Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977);
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
These cases result from Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 133 (1973). This note in
no way endorses the legal, ethical, or medical reasons underpinning Roe.
See generally Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920 (1973); J. NOONAN, A PRIVATE CHOICE, ABORTION IN AMERICA
IN THE SEVENTIES (1979).
15. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Hunt v. McNair, 413
U.S. 297 (1973); Roemer v. Maryland Board of Public Works, 426 U.S.
736 (1976). But see Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
16. The Court's paranoia about the influence of religion is most
nakedly revealed in its suppositions about the social sophistication
of school children. In its establishment clause decisions, the Court
frequently adverts to the immaturity of school children and to
their corresponding inability properly to distinguish the roles of
church and state, and thus to withstand the implicit coercion of
religious belief or disbelief that may be present in a church-state
relationship. The observation often is made without supporting
evidence that children are in fact confused or intimidated by ei-
ther church or state, thus revealing that the Court considers chil-
dren presumptively incapable of understanding church-state rela-
tionships. Accordingly, the Court acts to protect children from
even the slightest hint of religious coercion that may emanate
from such a relationship by banning virtually all connections be-
tween religion and public schools, on the one hand, and govern-
ment and private religious schools, on the other.
Such solicitude for the simple and immature psyche is not al-
ways present in other constitutional contexts. Mature decisions
about whether to terminate a pregnancy or to engage in sexual
activity, for example, clearly require intellectual, moral, and social
sophistication at least equal to that necessary to discern and with-
stand state promotions of religion. Nevertheless, statutes
grounded in the (quite reasonable) assumption that children are
presumptively incapable of making the complex judgments im-,
plicit in the decision to undergo an abortion or to use contracep-
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The Court's characterizations relate to an individual's
autonomy, or the capacity of an individual to determine his
or her life choices. 17 Autonomy is inextricably tied to the dig-
nity of the human being and to the maturity of the person.
The individual's ability to be self-determining in the fullest
sense is "full autonomy." '18 "Intermediate autonomy" de-
notes the partially developed capacity to determine one's life
choices. "Primary autonomy" is a severely restricted and un-
tives have been uniformly struck down as unconstitutional imposi-
tions on the child's right to privacy. It is difficult to understand
why there should be a conclusive presumption of immaturity in
church-state contexts, but not in other contexts, unless one starts
with the premise that exposure of children to public religious in-
fluences is a social negative and, therefore, to be minimized by
keeping religious belief and activity scrupulously private.
Gedicks and Hendrix, Democracy, Autonomy, and Values: Some Thoughts on
Religion and Law in Modern America, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1579, 1613-14
(1987),
17. The definition of autonomy has proved puzzling to philosophers
for centuries. This comment shall offer a broadly Kantian account of au-
tonomy. Kant's notion is complex, but it is tied to dignity, reason, and
choice or determination. For example, Kant wrote:
Autonomy is therefore the ground of the dignity of human nature
and of every rational nature . . . .Autonomy of the will is the
property the will has of being a law to itself (independently of
every property belonging to the object of volition). Hence the
principle of autonomy is "Never to choose except in such a way
that in the same volition the maxims of your choice are also pre-
sent as universal law."
I. KANT, THE MORAL LAW, 99, 101 (H. Paton trans. 1948). According to
John Rawls, Kant held that: [A] person is acting autonomously when the
principles of his action are chosen by him as the most adequate possible
expression of his nature as a free and equal rational being. J. RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 252 (1971).
It is well outside the scope of this note to provide a coherent and thor-
ough definition of autonomy. It will suffice to understand that when the
note employs autonomy it generally springs from the Kantian tradition and
thus encompasses the definition of autonomy as an informed choice of
principles of action chosen in such a way as to comport with reason and
freedom. It is helpful to think of autonomy in an etymological sense: auto
springs from the Greek, meaning self; nomos comes from the Greek, mean-
ing determination, governance, or law. Thus autonomy means self-determi-
nation, self-law, or self-governance.
18. Admittedly, when applied in a legal context this terminology is
somewhat misleading. Under a Kantian scheme, a person cannot become
fully autonomous. At best, a person is partially autonomous. It follows that
adolescents and children are really lesser degrees of partially autonomous
beings. To avoid the problems of attaching terminology to these lessening
degrees of partial autonomy, this note adopts the legal fiction that adults
are fully autonomous and proceeds from that point in its description of
adolescents and children.
19881
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
derdeveloped capacity to make life choices; nevertheless, it
indicates that, by virtue of being a human being, one will de-
velop those capacities for self-determination at some later
stage in life.19 Simply put, autonomy is meaningful and in-
formed self-determination.a
The Court properly considers a youngster's stage of au-
tonomy as a valid criterion in establishment clause analysis.
This note, however, argues that Judge Ritchie erroneously
saw the adolescents in Kendrick as mere children with primary
autonomy, and thus highly impressionable and subject to in-
doctrination. This mistaken characterization tied his analysis
to establishment clause cases challenging state-funding of ele-
mentary and secondary schools attended by primarily autono-
mous children who were susceptible to coercion. This note
argues that the proper characterization of the adolescents in
Kendrick is intermediately autonomous.
This note's plan is unorthodox yet simple, namely to use
Supreme Court precedent concerning minors' access to abor-
tions and apply it to establishment clause issues. The Court,
in Bellotti v. Baird2 1 and related cases, has offered a character-
ization of youngsters who seek information for abortion or
procreative decisions: they are not mere children, and they
are not impressionable. It will be argued that the rationale of
Bellotti is valid even though the result, given the seriousness
of the life and death nature of abortion, was clearly wrong.
In other words, if the Court takes the rationale of Bellotti se-
riously - that many adolescents are mature enough to make
life or death determinations - then, when applied to the
preventive contraceptive matters of AFLA, it should recog-
nize that the youngsters in Kendrick are not impressionable.
Since the adolescents addressed by AFLA are intermediately
autonomous, religious and charitable groups can supply secu-
lar, contraceptive and procreative education without the
threat of state-sponsored religious indoctrination or coercion.
Part I of this note reviews the analysis of the district
court in Kendrick. Part II discusses the case law underpinning
that decision and illustrates how Judge Ritchie's decision re-
19. In reference to those who are mentally retarded, the definition of
autonomy includes the notion that such persons would develop those capac-
ities for self-determination if they were not retarded.
20. Coercive activity such as indoctrination defeats attempts to be-
come self-determining. See I. KANT, THE MORAL LAW (H. Paton trans.
1948).
21. 443 U.S. 622 (1979) holding that informed consent provisions
for an abortion violated minors' due process rights.
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flects tensions within the Supreme Court's current establish-
ment clause jurisprudence. Part III describes the competing
conceptions of youngsters used by the Supreme Court:
youngsters having primary autonomy and youngsters having
intermediate autonomy. Part IV relates how AFLA, in al-
lowing religious organizations to educate on matters of sexual
responsibility, actually advances the autonomy of adolescents
and meets constitutional dictates.
I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S OPINION
Judge Ritchie stated the issue in Kendrick succinctly:
"The fundamental question in this case is the constitutional-
ity of a statute that allows religious organizations to use gov-
ernment funds for, inter alia, the counseling and teaching of
adolescents on matters related to premarital sexual relations
and teenage pregnancy."2
In examining AFLA23 the Kendrick court applied the
three-pronged establishment clause test enunciated in Lemon
v. Kurtzman.24 The Lemon test requires a series of threshold
examinations by the court. To meet constitutional muster
under Lemon, AFLA must have a valid secular purpose, must
not-on its face or as applied-have the primary effect of ad-
vancing or inhibiting religion, and must not foster an exces-
sive entanglement between government and religion.25
22. Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. 1547, 1551 (D.D.C. 1987).
23. Id. at 1551.
24. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In Lemon, the Court
decided that Pennsylvania's and Rhode Island's statutes providing state aid
to church-related elementary and secondary schools violated the establish-
ment clause. Pennsylvania's statute reimbursed these church-related
schools for the costs of teachers' salaries, textbooks, and secular instruc-
tional materials. The Rhode Island statue provided private school teachers
with a direct pay supplement.
After applying the establishment clause to the states in Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 96 (1940), and prior to Lemon, the Court's establishment
clause jurisprudence proceeded on an ad hoc basis. Thus, the decisions gave
little guidance and, at times, seemed inconsistent.
Of course, nobody should ignore the ruminations and rumblings, even
among members of the Court, that the Lemon test is inadequate.
25. Quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612; Kendrick, 657 F. Supp. at 1557.
The Kendrick court also considered a fourth inquiry relevant, namely
that AFLA must not cause "political division along religious lines" (citing
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 365 n.15, 372 (1975)). Kendrick, 657 F.
Supp. at 1557.
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A. Valid Secular Purpose Inquiry
The Kendrick court first addressed the purpose of the stat-
ute.2 6 A statute lacking a valid secular purpose violates the
Constitution.2 7 The court emphasized that-at least for the
purpose of determining a valid secular purpose-.-the simple
sharing of purpose by religion and the state does not provide
a per se basis for determining an invalid secular purpose:28
"That these secular purposes coincide or conflict with reli-
gious tenets does not transform them into sectarian purposes
motivated wholly by religious considerations. "29
A review of the legislative history convinced the court
that it was congressional concern for the grave effects of
teenage pregnancy which prompted the enactment of the
statute. 0 "[E]ncourag[ing] parents and family members to
26. Kendrick, 657 F. Supp. at 1558.
27. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Engle v. Vitale, 370
U.S.421 (1962). Seldom does a statute get struck down under this prong.
But see Wallace v. Jaffree 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985); Edwards v. Aguillard, 107
S. Ct 2573 (1987).
Judge Ritchie wrote, "Courts invalidate legislation or government action
on the ground that it lacks a valid secular purpose only when the statute or
activity involved is motivated wholly by religious considerations." Kendrick,
657 F. Supp. at 1558.
28. See Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701,
725 (1986): "The secular purpose requirement thus means that if enough
people take religion seriously, they cannot enact their program, but if they
favor the same program for other reasons, they can enact it."
29. Kendrick, 657 F. Supp. at 1558. Is this conclusion consistent with
the court's later "on the face" analysis at 1562 and 1563? It would seem
not. If the "sharing" of purposes by both state and religion does not, by
itself, transform the secular purpose into a religious purpose, it surely fol-
lows that the "sharing" of the means by which to advance those purposes
(abstinence, adoption) does not magically transform a secular mission into a
religious mission. (Cf. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 319 (1980)).
30. In passing AFLA the United States Congress reacted to alarming
increases in teenage pregnancies. 42 U.S.C. § 300z (1982). In 1978 alone
approximately one million, one hundred-thousand teenagers became preg-
nant; a high percentage of those gave birth out of wedlock and eventuallyjoined the welfare rolls. Significantly, these teenagers lacked basic informa-
tion from which to make an informed choice concerning having a child,
raising that child, and forming any definitive life plans. Also pertinent were
the following findings: adolescents aged seventeen and younger accounted
for more than one-half of the out-of-wedlock births to teenagers; in a high
proportion of those cases, the pregnant adolescent is herself a product of
an unmarried parenthood during adolescence and is continuing the pattern
in her own lifestyle; pregnancy and childbirth among unmarried adoles-
cents, particularly young adolescents, often results in adverse health, social
and economic consequences, including: a higher incidence of low birth-
weight babies, a higher frequency of developmental disabilities, higher in-
fant mortality and morbidity.
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provide guidance and support to adolescents by promoting
prudent approaches, such as self-discipline. . 1 constituted
a valid secular purpose for AFLA. 3 '
B. Primary Effect to Advance Religion
Under the second prong of the Lemon analysis, the court
discussed what constitutes "the"3 primary effect to advance re-
The Committee also expressed concerns that "there is a paucity of inf or-
mation and agencies attempting to get parents and their children together
to deal effectively with the issue, both social and moral, surrounding pre-
marital sexual relations." The Committee made a judgment: promiscuous
safe-sex is, in their and experts' view, "dehumanizing." Id. The Committee
stressed that the country ought to inculcate traditional morality, because
"many adolescent girls require reassurance that it is 'alright' [sic] and 'nor-
mal' to be a virgin." S. Rep. No. 97-161, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1981).
31. Referring to 42 U.S.C. 300z-2b. The court apparently vindicated
Congress' endorsement of these virtues, thus positing "prudence" as an ac-
ceptable secular virtue.
32. Senator Jeremiah Denton (R-AL), then Chairman of the Senate
Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, charac-
terized AFLA as
authoriz[ing] appropriations for demonstration grants to individu-
als, public and non-public entities for services and research in the
area of premarital sexual relations and pregnancy. . .[and to] en-
courage the involvement of the family and the community
through religious, charitable, and voluntary associations, in help-
ing adolescent boys and girls understand the secular purpose of
premarital sexual relations, pregnancy, and parenthood.
S.Rep. No. 97-161, supra note 5, at 2.
The Committee emphasized the gravity and complexity of the situation,
so as to require a continued federal concern: "[t]hus, the teenage preg-
nancy problem consists of several intertwined aspects: the moral issues of
premarital sexual relations, abortion, and illegitimate birth; [and] questions
concerning the well-being and prosperity of the family." Congress envis-
aged involvement of voluntary associations with both expertise and an un-
derstanding of local problems. Included in these local agents were a variety
of voluntary, private associations: families, non-profit associations, charity
groups, and religious organizations. Id. at 10. The inclusion of religious
organizations as a private, voluntary social service group simply recognized
that "non-profit religious organizations have a role to play in the provision
of services." Id. at 15-16. Congress can help only in a limited way: "...
the committee concludes that the causes of teenage premarital sexual rela-
tions and pregnancy are multifactional and, therefore, require an inte-
grated family approach taking into account the sensitive and private nature
of these problems." Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
33. It is interesting that the district court wrote the opinion using
"the." Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
473 U.S. 756 (1973), seemed to have changed the test from "the primary
effect" to "a primary effect." However, Justice Rehnquist, writing the ma-
1988]
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
ligion," and whether the primary effect of AFLA advances
religion in this particular instance. In order to violate the
Constitution, AFLA would have to have "the direct and im-
mediate" effect of advancing religion. 4 There exists no pre-
cise formula for this determination. The strategies for evalu-
ation include whether AFLA "allows participants in a
government-funded program to 'intentionally or inadver-
tently inculcat[e] particular religious tenets or beliefs' ",31 in-
volves "impressionable youngsters"" provides "a crucial sym-
bolic link between government and religion" 9 or subsidizes
the "primary religious mission" of those groups receiving
40monies.
Judge Ritchie noted that aid of a religious group is not
per se violative of the Constitution. The funding, however,
cannot raise the inference of official subsidy of religious be-
liefs,4 1especially when the government "subsidy cannot be
segregated from religious activity."'4 2 In short, AFLA cannot
result in support of religion and it cannot restrict the auton-
omy of the youngsters involved in the program, if it is to be
held constitutional.
1. On Its Face, AFLA has the Primary Effect of Advancing
Religion.
Judge Ritchie ruled that, by funding religious organiza-
tions' teaching and counseling of adolescents" on matters re-
jority opinion in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), emphasized that
the Court was using "the" once again. The district court's cite to Nyquist is
thus confusing.
34. This determination is not one of "metaphysical" proportions,
rather it stems from general observations of the overall effects of the stat-
ute. In other words, it cannot be merely a "remote and incidental effect."
Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. 1547, 1560 (D.D.C. 1987).
37. Kendrick, 657 F. Supp. at 1561 (citing Grand Rapids School Dis-
trict v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216, 3223 (1985) (emphasis added).
38. Kendrick, 657 F. Supp. at 1561.
39. Id. (referring to Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3223-34). See also
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977). The factor centers on the sym-
bolic link in the eyes of impressionable youngsters.
40. Kendrick, 657 F. Supp. at 1561 (referring to Grand Rapids, 105 S.
Ct. at 3226). See also Committee for Public Education and Religious Lib-
erty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 657 (1980); Levitt v. Committee for Public
Education and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 476 (1973); Committee for
Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 774-81
(1973).
41. Kendrick, 657 F. Supp. at 1562.
42. Id.
43. Congress believed that the situation merited a federal response,
[Vol. 3
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lated to religious doctrine,"" AFLA, on its face,"' had the pri-
mary effect of advancing religion. AFLA's intention to allow
religious organizations to teach on matters that are "funda-
mental elements of religious doctrine" alone demonstrated
AFLA's "direct and immediate effect" of advancing reli-
gion.4 6 Judge Ritchie noted that AFLA envisioned grantees
one which would not displace and at the same time encourage local action
in confronting the problem. AFLA allowed the Department of Health and
Human Services to disperse grants to those groups meeting statutory
guidelines. The monies were in fact disbursed according to the constitu-
tionally infirm provisions of the act:
42 U.S.C. 300z-5(a): An application for a grant for a demonstra-
tion project for services . . . shall include-..
(21) a description of how the applicant will, as appropriate in the
provision of services-...
(B) involve religious and charitable organizations, voluntary as-
sociations, and other groups in the private sector as well as ser-
vices provided by publicly sponsored activities
The restrictive guidelines for such grants provide that funding availability
is contingent on the non-existence of family counseling services in the com-
munity and monies are available only to programs that do not provide
abortion "counseling or referral." 42 U.S.C. 300z-3(b) (1982).
44. The court points out that seven out of seventeen services listed by
AFLA involve some sort of "education or counseling." Worse, two other
services, the Court shows, are involved with education insofar as they in-
volve " 'outreach services to families of adolescents to discourage sexual
relations among unemancipated minors' and 'family planning services.' "
Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. 1547, 1562 (D.D.C. 1987) (citing to 42
U.S.C. §§ 300z-1(a)(4)(O) & (P)).
The district court in footnote 13 raises what may be an insurmountable
problem for AFLA: Congress failed to express a caveat or condition to or-
ganization receiving funding so as to prohibit those organizations from us-
ing government funds to teach religion. The Supreme Court does not as-
sume the existence of such a prohibition: " 'where Congress intends to
impose a condition on the grant of federal funds, 'it must do so unambigu-
ously.' School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, -U.S.-., 107 S. Ct. 1123,
1132, 94 L.Ed.2d 307 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Pen-
nhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17, 101 S. Ct.
1531, 1539, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981))." Kendrick, 657 F. Supp. at 1563 n.13.
45. A facial attack on a statute is the most difficult to mount. See
United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2100 (1987); Roemer v. Mary-
land Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 761 (1976): "It has not been
the Court's practice, in considering facial challenges of this kind, to strike
them down in anticipation that particular applications may result in an un-
constitutional use of funds."
In the case of a federal statute the attack must also overcome the defer-
ence accorded to the United States Congress. See Walters v. National Asso-
ciation of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 315 (1985). See also Scalia, On
Making It Look Easy By Doing It Wrong: A Critical View of the Justice Depart-
ment, in PRIVATE SCHOOLS AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 177 (E. Gaffney ed. 1981).
46. Kendrick, 657 F. Supp. at 1562.
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teaching about the ills of sexual promiscuity and abortion,
matters of religious doctrine.4" The court based this conclu-
sion on the "fact" that many religions oppose premarital sex
and abortion. 6 Judge Ritchie then concluded that AFLA
subsidized the religious missions of sectarian organizations."
Moreover, the district court ruled that the "mere possi-
bility" of subsidized religious inculcation violated the first
amendment. The court opined that the Congress could not
expect religious counselors to forgo instruction on religious
doctrine in administering AFLA.1 According to Judge
Ritchie, the fact that a single teacher, consciously or uncon-
sciously, may instruct on religious matters violates the estab-
lishment clause: "This possibility alone amounts to an impermissi-
ble advancement of religion."51 The nature of the program
47. "Put plain, these functions amount to teaching by grant recipients
and subcontractors, including religious organizations, about the harm of
premarital sexual relations and the factors supporting a choice of adoption
rather than abortion, and these matters are fundamental elements of reli-
gious doctrine." Id.
48. "It is a fundamental tenet of many religions that premarital sex
and abortion are wrong, even sinful." Id. at 1563.
See also United States v. Dykema, 666 F.2d 1096, 1104 (7th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 983 (1982).
The court seems to equate religious disapproval of abortion with all op-
position to abortion.
49. Judge Ritchie wrote that "contemplating that the provision of aid
to organizations affiliated with these religions-aid for the purpose of en-
couraging abstinence and adoption-the AFLA contemplates subsidizing a
fundamental religious mission of those organizations." Kendrick, 657 F.
Supp. at 1563.
Likewise, the court notices the "crucial symbolic link" between govern-
ment and religion by AFLA's envisioning of religious organizations coun-
seling and teaching adolescents on premarital sex and abstinence. Id. at
1563-64.
But see Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (the constitutionality of the
Hyde amendment) "Although neither a State nor the Federal Government
can constitutionally 'pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another' Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1,
15, it does not follow that a statute violates the Establishment Clause be-
cause it 'happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all
religions'. McGowen v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442. That the Judaeo-
Christian religions oppose stealing does not mean that a State or the Fed-
eral Government may not, consistent with the Establishment Clause, enact
laws prohibiting larceny." Id. at 319.
50. Kendrick, 657 F. Supp. at 1563 ("[G]overnment would tread im-
permissibly on religious liberty merely by suggesting that religious organi-
zations instruct on doctrinal matters without any conscious or unconscious
reference to that doctrine.") (emphasis in original).
51. Id. at 1563 (referring to Grand Rapids School District v. Ball,
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established under AFLA, including the teaching of matters
that coincide with religious doctrine, created a constitution-
ally impermissible endorsement and support of religion."
The mere possibility that an AFLA teacher or program will
violate a youth's autonomy by instructing on religious mat-
ters violated the establishment clause.
2. The Constitutionality of AFLA as Applied.
The district court further opined that AFLA, as applied
to the facts, had the primary effect of advancing religion.
This occurred in two ways: (a) overt religious establishment
activity-grantees and subgrantees were overtly religious or-
ganizations who were incorporated and managed by formal
religious doctrines58 and (b) covert religious establishment ac-
tivity-grantees and subgrantees who, although not formal
religious organizations, had at some time in their history, or
in their literature, pronounced or recognized either a dedica-
tion or inspiration from religious principles.5
In the case of overt religious organizations, the court
pointed to three instances as illustrative of unconstitutional
behavior."5 In describing covert religious activity, the court
105 S. Ct. 3216, 3225 (1985)) (emphasis in original). The district court
cites Grand Rapids for support, yet Grand Rapids speaks of the "substantial
risk" rather than the "mere possibility." Grand Rapids, 87 L.Ed.2d at 280,
(citing Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Regan,
444 U.S. 646 (1980)).
52. But a larger question looms: should constitutional principles de-
pend on the recognizable affiliations of individuals; specifically, what guar-
antee does one have against a religious member of a purely secular organi-
zation making "unconscious reference" to religious doctrine?
Are we to believe that religious organizations cannot compete in the pro-
vision of admittedly secular services simply because a member of that organi-
zations might inculcate religious values in youth?
This creates an odd situation. When a religious organization wants to
provide the same services that Congress wants private groups to provide,
they cannot. But, if they are non-affiliated, then it is permissible.
53. Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. 1547, 1564 (D.D.C. 1987).
54. Id.
55. In one case, St. Margaret's Hospital told an employee that she
must abide by the guidelines articulated in a directive issued by a local reli-
gious office. Id. at 1564-65.
Similarly, employee guidelines barred the counselors at St. Ann's Infant
and Maternity House from counseling, advocating, or aiding inabortion
referrals. Id. at 1565.
However, this does not contradict AFLA's permissive exceptions on its
restrictions:
Grants or payments may be made only to programs or projects
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acknowledged that some grantees were, on the surface, sim-
ply a voluntary association of private individuals, yet constitu-
tional problems existed since the organization or some of the
individuals in the organization were inspired by religious
teaching."' This connection between a private group and reli-
gion takes on a greater significance because of the subject
matter of the case, namely "a federal program that implicates
religious tenets.157 Consequently, the court concluded that
federal funds subsidized pervasively sectarian " organizations
in their teaching of religious dogma.' 9
To analyze these challenges, the parties before the court
urged application of different lines of first amendment case
which do not provide abortions or abortion counseling or referral,
or which do not subcontract with or make any payment to any
person who provides abortions or abortion counseling or referral,
except that any such program or project may provide referral for
abortion counseling to a pregnant adolescent if such adolescent
and the parents or guardians of such adolescent request such
referral.
42 U.S.C. 300z-(10) (a) (1982) (emphasis added).
In still another instance the court found that one of the grantees had
stated as a goal in its articles of incorporation that its goals included pro-
moting the teachings of the Lutheran Church. Altogether the record indi-
cated ten (10) grantees or subgrantees that were religious organizations
that manifested overt religious bonds to sectarian organizations. Kendrick,
657 F. Supp. at 1565.
56. For example, a subgrantee under AFLA was the Family of the
America's Foundation [FAF]. FAF is an affiliate of WOOMB-International.
Since WOOMB states in some of its literature that it draws inspiration
from the papal encyclical Humanae Vitae, and since WOOMB's director is-
sues a report on the group's activities to the Pope, the court found an im-
permissible amount of religious influence. Kendrick, 657 F. Supp. at 1565.
This note realizes that deep problems exist for this part of the opinion
and the free exercise clause of the First Amendment.
57. Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. 1547, 1565 (D.D.C. 1987).
58. "The district court elided that distinction entirely [between per-
vasively sectarian and non-pervasively sectarian institutions], assuming in-
stead that any religious organization that participates in an AFLA program
will inevitably inculcate religious doctrine or, on the other hand, will re-
quire excessive government monitoring in order to avoid doing so." Juris.
Statement for Sol. Gen. at 9, Bowen v. Kendrick, 657 F. Supp. 1547
(D.D.C. 1987) (no. 87-253).
59. "Because these religious organizations use federal funds to edu-
cate or counsel on matters inseparable from religious dogma ... the ines-
capable conclusion is that federal funds have been used by pervasively sec-
tarian institutions to teach matters inherently tied to religion." Kendrick,
657 F. Supp. at 1565.
In short, the court found AFLA, as applied, had the primary effect of
advancing religion because it allowed "religious" organizations to use state
monies to subsidize their own religious messages. Id.
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law to the largely undisputed facts: those challenging AFLA
argued previous decisions invalidating state aid of religiously-
affiliated primary and secondary schools, such as Aguilar v.
Felton 0 and Grand Rapids v. Ball,"' controlled; conversely,
those supporting AFLA urged the Court to apply its prece-
dent validating state support of colleges and universities with
religious ties, such as Tilton v. Richardson,62 Roemer v. Mary-
land Board of Public Works, 63 and Hunt v. McNair." In es-
sence, the challengers argued that AFLA participants were
similar to elementary and secondary school children and
AFLA organizations were similar to elementary and second-
ary schools. The AFLA supporters portrayed AFLA partici-
pants as similar to college and university students and the or-
ganizations as similar to colleges and universities. The district
court agreed with the challengers by ruling that the AFLA
organizations were "pervasively sectarian," thus depicting
them and their participants as similar to religious elementary
and secondary schools and their students.
As will be discussed below, the district court's analysis in
Kendrick can be questioned on three grounds. First, it is ques-
tionable whether the court correctly found that the religious
organizations receiving AFLA funds were pervasively secta-
rian (part II). Second, the court failed to address an essential
criterion of establishment clause analysis, that of the appro-
priate view of adolescents' stage of autonomy: whether the
adolescents were more similar to the children of Grand
Rapids or to the "mature" college students of Tilton and Bel-
lotti (part III)." Third, the court erroneously doubted the
constitutionality of the State's use of religious organizations
to impart secular values that coincide with the tenets of some
religions (part IV)." To address each of these contentions, it
60. 472 U.S. 402 (1985).
61. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
62. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
63. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
64. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
65. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622 (1979). One commentator has remarked, "Just as age has been a
criterion in free exercise cases . . ., so it has been in the area of education.
Colleges and universities have been approached differently from schools."
J. NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE 428 (1987) (citations
omitted). This observation is, to be sure, critical to this note's argument
insofar as age relates to one's stage of autonomy.
66. This refers to the second prong of the Lemon test, the primary
effect test.
This questioning of Congress' propriety in recognizing a value that coin-
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is first necessary to refresh our understanding of relevant Su-
preme Court precedent.7 It is to that immediate task that
this note now turns.
cides with a religious value contradicts the court's analysis with respect to
the "purpose" test where it finds that the mere coincidence of these values
does not establish a religion.
67. In discussing the intent and history of establishment clause one
opens a jurisprudential Pandora's box: the historical record is muddled, the
textual issues tangled, and the commentary generally inconclusive. See gen-
erally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 14-3 (2d ed. 1988).
On the most basic level, all can agree that the framers, at the very least,
sought to avoid the official establishment of a state religion. See generally R.
MCCARTHY, J. SKILLEN, AND W. HARPER, DISESTABLISHMENT A SECOND TIME
(1982); Gianella, Religious Liberty, Non-Establishment, and Doctrinal Develop-
ment Part II: The Non-Establishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. R. 513 (1968).
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion,
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can
force nor influence a person to go to or remain from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing
religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-at-
tendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to
support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may
be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice
religion.
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
This note will eschew historical justification as the primary source for
establishment clause adjudication in order to persuade those not so com-
mitted to original intent. See Abington School District v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963):
A too literal quest for the advice of the Founding Fathers upon
the issues of these cases seems to me futile and misdirected for
several reasons: First, on our precise problem the historical record
is at best ambiguous, and statements can readily be found to sup-
port either side of the proposition. . . . Second, the structure of
American education has greatly changed since the First Amend-
ment was adopted. . . Third, our religious composition makes
us a vastly more diverse people than were our forefathers. ...
Fourth, the American experiment in free public education availa-
ble to all children has been guided in large measure by the dra-
matic evolution of the religious diversity among the population
which our public schools serve.
Id. at 237-41 (Brennan, J., concurring).
[Vol. 3
AUTONOMOUS ADOLESCENTS
II. SUPREME COURT CASE LAW
A. Funding to Religious Organizations Not Pervasively
Sectarian
In Tilton v. Richardson8 the United States Supreme
Court considered whether religiously-affiliated colleges could
receive state funding without violating the establishment
clause. The Court distinguished the colleges in Tilton from
elementary and secondary schools insofar as colleges, univer-
sities, and similar educational institutions are not as perva-
sively sectarian as religious elementary and secondary
schools. 9 The Court discussed the extent to which religion
permeated the institutions70 and whether the institutions re-
stricted the freedom of its members, or of outsiders, by re-
quiring participation in religious practices or limiting partici-
pation to members of its own faith. 1 Most significantly, the
Tilton Court pointed to the maturity of the institution's stu-
dents. This maturity provided a safeguard against the impres-
sion of state-sponsored religion: "There is substance to the con-
tention that college students are less susceptible to religious
indoctrination.17 2 This maturity, reflective of autonomy, pro-
vides the doctrinal underpinnings of the distinction between
permissible aid to sectarian colleges and impermissible aid to
elementary and secondary sectarian schools.7
68. 403 U.S. 672 (1970).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 680-82 ("[R]eligion did not so permeate the defendant col-
leges that their religious and secular functions were inseparable ....
[T]here was no evidence that religious activities took place in funded facili-
ties.") Note the standard is not mere possibility, but rather evidence of spe-
cific incidents.
71. "No religious services were required to be attended" and the in-
stitutions "were not restricted to adherents of faith." Id.
Accord: "There are generally significant differences between religious as-
pects of church-related institutions of higher learning and parochial ele-
mentary and secondary schools. The 'affirmative if not the dominant pol-
icy' of the instruction in pre-college church schools is 'to assure future
adherents to a particular faith by having control of their total education at
an early age.' Waz v. Tax Comm'n, supra, at 671." Tilton v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 672, 685-86 (1971) (footnotes omitted).
Again, Kendrick organizations did not profess as their dominant policy
anything of this sort.
72. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 68 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
73. The Tilton Court made it clear that the autonomy of the particu-
lar citizen is an essential consideration: "There is substance to the conten-
tion that students are less impressionable and less susceptible to religious
indoctrination." 403 U.S. at 686 (citing Gianella, Religious Liberty, NonEst-
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In Hunt v. McNair,7 citizens challenged the South Caro-
lina Facilities Authority Act insofar as it proposed financing
transactions involving the issuance of revenue bonds benefit-
ing a Baptist-controlled college .7  The Court held that the
statute did not have the primary effect of advancing or inhib-
iting religion. Again, the Court drew attention to the charac-
ter of the students in the institutions and the coercive aspects
of the institutions on students' autonomy: "both the faculty
and the student body are open to persons of any (or no) reli-
gious affiliation."7'6 The simple existence of sectarian control
of an organization, or mere formal denominational control
over an educational establishment, does not violate the estab-
lishment clause."
ablishment, and Doctrinal Development Part II: The Nonestablishment Principle,
81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 574 (1968)).
This illustrates what may be the most defensible doctrinal underpinnings
that have developed with respect to funding of schools: the determinate
factor of the analysis is the maturity, or autonomy, of the citizen being
educated rather than the character of the institution educating that citizen.
Maturity is a component of autonomy.
Even Leo Pfeffer admits that this may be a valid justification for the
Court's decisions involving both types of schools.
A reasonable argument could be made to support Burger's dis-
tinguishing between higher and lower educational institutions. As
noted in the opinion, by the time students reach college age they
are mature . . . .Their religious commitments are generally fixed
so that they can reasonably be expected to withstand efforts by
instructors to sway them from the faith of their fathers .. .
L. PFEFFER, RELIGION, STATE AND THE BURGER COURT 53 (1986).
74. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
75. The plan here did not cost the taxpayers anything in the form of
grants, but rather it gave colleges a break on interest rates.
76. Hunt, 413 U.S. at 746, n.8. Note that AFLA programs are open
to all persons regardless of religious affiliation. The record reveals not a
single instance contrary to this.
Hunt also illuminated the application of the primary effect to facial analy-
sis : "Aid normally may be thought to have the primary effect of advancing
religion when it flows to an institution in which religion is so persuasive
that a substantial portion of its factors are subsumed in the religious mis-
sion or when it funds a specifically religious activity in an otherwise sub-
stantially secular setting." Id. at 743.
77. More significantly, the Hunt Court dictated a burden of persua-
sion far different from Judge Ritchie's "mere possibility" standard. The
Hunt Court wrote, "Although the record in this case is abbreviated and not
free from ambiguity, the burden rests on appellant to show the extent to
which the College [the religious organization] is church related, cf. Board of
Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. at 248, and he has failed to show more than a
formalistic relationship." Id. at 746-47 n.8.
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In Roemer v. Maryland Board of Public Works"' the Court
faced the issue of a state's release of funds to private colleges,
including religiously-affiliated institutions, provided that the
funds were not used for "sectarian purposes."'79 Once again,
the Court engaged the question by focusing on institutions
and the students in those institutions. This allowed the Court
to distinguish schools in Roemer from elementary and second-
ary schools insofar as the latter enrolled young, impressiona-
ble children.80 Distinctively, the institutions in Roemer were
"characterized by a high degree of institutional autonomy.''"
78. 426 U.S. 736 (1976). See Garvey, Another Way of Looking at School
Aid, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. 61, 67. This review illuminates the conflicting and
confusing decisions produced by Lemon and its progeny. Other factors in
this analysis have either lost their attractiveness or created other conflicts:
Although the fear of political divisiveness may still lurk in the
background, it is no longer the primary impetus for adherence to
a strict separation of church and state. . . . The rationale of pro-
tecting the integrity of the civic sphere from religious discord is
problematic, however, because it hints at a form of content regula-
tion at odds with the first amendment value of a marketplace of
ideas.
Developments in the Law, Religion and the State 100 HARv. L. REv. 1606,
1686, 1685 (1987) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Developments].
79. 426 U.S. 736 (1976). The statute in question proscribed that
"[n]one of the monies payable under this subtitle shall be utilized by the
institution for sectarian purposes." MD. ANN. CODE art. 77A, § 66 (e)
(1975).
This seminal decision stressed the continued validity of Bradfield v. Rob-
erts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899), which upheld state funding of a charitable hospi-
tal operated by a religious order.
80. This refers to those schools in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971). For example, the secondary schools in Lemon created an atmo-
sphere that restricted the autonomy of its students: the funded schools
were "characterized by substantial religious activity and purpose," Roemer,
326 U.S. at 748; "religious symbols abounded," Roemer, 326 U.S. at 747;
and were run almost entirely by members of religious orders and regarded
as "an integral part of the religious mission of the Catholic Church."
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 616; Roemer, 326 U.S. at 747. Generally, the presence
of religious symbols can be seen as subtle and not-so-subtle forms of incul-
cation, in respect to impressionable youngsters.
81. Roemer v. Maryland Board of Public Works, 387 F. Supp. at
1282, 1287 (1974). Cf John Noonan's comment on the Court's characteri-
zation: "The Court brushed aside the facts that the colleges had required
theology courses, that a number of teachers opened their classes with
prayer, and that some members of the college faculties were members of
religious orders." J. NOONAN, supra note 65, at 431.
It is helpful to distinguish between this institutional autonomy and the
adolescent's autonomy spoken of earlier. In simplest terms, institutional au-
tonomy represents the freedom of a collectivity to be self-determining. Yet,
there is a limited range of options for this self-determination. In this way,
institutional autonomy is far narrower that individual autonomy.
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The Roemer schools had no policy of mandatory attendance at
sectarian worship sessions, partly because they considered the
spiritual development of their students a "secondary objec-
tive." 8 Under Roemer, state funding to religious organiza-
tions that respect the autonomy of their students is
constitutional.8"
In general, the rationale of Tilton, Hunt, and Roemer
demonstrates that the Court gives weighty consideration to
the students of a particular institution in determining
whether that institution is pervasively sectarian. The determi-
nation of a pervasively sectarian organization turns on the de-
gree of freedom afforded to students and to the maturity of
those students in an educational institution.
B. Funding To Pervasively Sectarian Organizations
As noted, the challengers in Kendrick relied on Grand
Rapids and Aguilar. These cases are clearly distinguishable.
Plainly, Grand Rapids and Aguilar involve highly impressiona-
ble children in elementary and secondary schools, whose pri-
mary mission is to develop the faith of their students. As a
general matter, Catholic elementary and secondary schools
are pervasively sectarian without qualification: they admit
that their primary purpose is to develop the spirituality of
those youngsters who attend the schools. AFLA envisions no
funding to comparable organizations."
In Grand Rapids v. Ball, Michigan taxpayers challenged
the state's Shared Time and Community Education85 pro-
82. Roemer v. Maryland Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755-
56 (1976).
83. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 746. Cf.: "The judgment of the district court
places religious organizations [in Kendrick] under a disability, not imposed
by Congress, to which no other organization, public or private, is subject."
Juris. St. of the Solicitor General at 14, Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp.
1547 (D.D.C. 1987) (no. 87-253).
Roemer again emphasized a principle that had guided the Court since the
Founding, namely that religious institutions could compete without hostil-
ity for funds available to all: "And religious institutions need not be quar-
antined from public benefits that are neutrally available to all. Roemer, 426
U.S. at 746 (emphasis added).
84. Adolescent Family Life Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300z-5(a)(2) (1982).
85. Although the Community Education program is offered to adults
as well as children, the appeal to the Supreme Court involves only the ap-
plicability to the Community Education classes held at the elementary and
remedial levels. See Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373
(1985).
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grams on establishment clause grounds.86 The Shared Time
program provided funding to public school teachers to teach
remedial classes in leased rooms of private schools.87 In order
to avoid constitutional problems, these private schools' class-
rooms were cleared of religious artifacts. 88 The Community
Education program used non-public school teachers8" to offer
adults and youngsters a variety of evening classes. 90 In analyz-
ing the challenges to these programs, the majority utilized
the Lemon inquiry, 1 and they focused on the location of the
education and the students being educated. 92
In Grand Rapids, the Court based much of its analysis on
the potential for indoctrination of an adolescent, which
would threaten his or her freedom of belief.9 Essentially, the
Court pinned its analysis to the impact of a teacher's coercive
actions that might infringe autonomy:
Nonetheless, there is a substantial risk that, overtly or sub-
tly, the religious message they [the teachers] are expected
to convey during the regular school day will infuse the sup-
posedly secular classes they teach after school. . . . Teach-
ers in such an atmosphere may well subtly (or overtly) con-
form their instruction to the environment in which they
teach. . ..
The costs of the autonomy loss were so significant that the
"substantial risk" (not, "mere possibility") of such an auton-
omy infringement violated the constitution."5 Thus, the
86. 473 U.S. at 375.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 378.
89. Id. at 376.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 382. But see id. at 384 n.6 (where the majority attempts to
justify the Lemon analysis rather than the Roemer, and its progeny, analysis).
Many of the schools in this case included prayer and attendance at
religious services as part of their curriculum, are run by churches
or other organizations whose members must subscribe to particu-
lar religious tenets, have faculties and student bodies composed
largely of the particular denomination, and give preference in ad-
herence to children belonging to the denomination.
Id. 546 F. Supp., at 1080-1084.
92. Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 384 (1985).
93. Id. at 385.
94. Id. at 387-88 (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 388 ("The Court of Appeals of course recognized that re-
spondents adduced no evidence of specific incidents of religious indoctrina-
tion in this case .... But the absence of proof of specific incidents is not
dispositive.") (citation omitted).
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Court employed the strictest scrutiny of an educational pro-gram if the citizens involved were children susceptible to au-
tonomy violations. 96
In Aguilar v. Felton,97 decided on the same day as Grand
Rapids, the Court invalidated disbursement of federal funds
to public school teachers to teach remedial reading in paro-
chial schools in inner-city New York.9 8 The program pro-
vided assistance only for parochial students.99 Justice Brennan
wrote that, despite the well-intentioned aid to deprived chil-
dren, the program violated the first amendment.'" These de-
prived children, elementary schools students, were
threatened by the risk of indoctrination' posed by the mes-
sage implicit in the link between religion and the state.102
In relation to the organizations themselves, one can
readily distinguish Kendrick from Grand Rapids. AFLA orga-
nizations in Kendrick allowed a great deal of autonomy for
their participants' 03 ; they neither discriminated nor preferred
96. "The inquiry into this kind of effect must be conducted with par-
ticular care when many of the citizens perceiving the governmental mes-
sage are children in their formative years." Id. at 389. The Court illus-
trates how this difference has translated into the establishment clause
jurisprudence by comparing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, (1983)
(holding that prayers that open legislative sessions do not violate the estab-
lishment clause) with Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 103
(1963) (holding that prayers that open public elementary and secondary
school violate the establishment clause). Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 388.
Thus, the Court admits that establishment clause cases may turn on the
characterization of the particular citizens involved in the program. If the
citizens are fully autonomous (Marsh) the Court will not review with the
strictest of scrutiny. If, on the other hand, the participants are less than
intermediately autonomous, the Court will pay particular attention to the
program.
97. 472 U.S. 402 (1985).
98. Id. at 406.
99. Id. at 404.
100. In an impassioned dissent, Chief Justice Burger writes,
I cannot join in striking down a program that, in the words of the
Court of Appeals, "has done so much good and little, if any, de-
tectable harm. The notion that denying these services to students
in religious school is a neutral act to protect us from an Estab-
lished Church has no support in logic, experience, or history."
Id. at 420.
101. Id. at 413.
102. Id. Compare these with Grand Rapids, where the fact that there
was no administrative overseer to guard against the inculcation of religious
values risked forbidden entanglement between church and state. From
these two cases, then, a Catch 22 emerges. See Aguilar, 472 U.S. at 420
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
103. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
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participants on the basis of religious affiliation'"; they were
open to persons of any or no religious affiliation'05; and most
significantly, they considered their primary objective to be the
physical and emotional needs, not the spiritual development,
of the participants. 10" In these ways, the AFLA organizations
in Kendrick should not be seen as pervasively sectarian.
Rather, they should be seen as analogous to the colleges and
universities in Tilton, Hunt, and Roemer.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S CHARACTERIZATION OF
YOUNGSTERS
In the preceding section, this note described how the
AFLA organizations in Kendrick were not pervasively secta-
rian. The note showed how the Kendrick organizations were
similar to those in Tilton and dissimilar to those organizations
in Grand Rapids. This comparison of institutions is the tradi-
tional manner of constitutional analysis. Yet, the preceding
section hinted at an underlying factor in determining
whether an organization is pervasively sectarian: the maturity
or immaturity of the students attending those institutions.
Indeed, one may be able to find that a justifiable ration-
ale for distinguishing permissible state aid to religious col-
leges from impermissible state aid to religious secondary
schools lies in the characterization of the youngsters involved
in the state-funded programs.1 07 The characterization of
youngsters as either immature (primarily autonomous) or ma-
ture (intermediately autonomous) is a valid and essential cri-
terion in establishment clause analysis. Both case law and con-
stitutional commentators support the validity of this
criterion.
Most recently, Justice Brennan admitted that a citizen's
maturity and impressionability inform the Court's analysis of
establishment clause issues and, in fact, offer the basis for dis-
tinguishing between permissible and impermissible state ac-
104. Id.
105. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 297 (1973).
106. Roemer v. Maryland Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736
(1976).
107. In concluding that state funding of sectarian organizations was
impermissible, both Kendrick and Grand Rapids base part of their analysis
on the fact that the youngsters in each school or program are impressiona-
ble and thus need protection. Nevertheless, the rationale of Grand Rapids
is incorrectly applied to Kendrick insofar as Grand Rapids indulges a view of
children as having primary autonomy, whereas the adolescents in Kendrick
have intermediate autonomy.
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tion. This rationale underpinned much of the Grand Rapids
analysis. Throughout the opinion, the Court emphasized no-
tions of involuntary belief, coercive pressures, and improper
ideological indoctrination in reference to the youngsters' im-
pressionable state. At one point Brennan writes,
The inquiry into this kind of effect must be conducted
with particular care when many of the citizens perceiving
the government message are children in their formative
years. . . . The symbolism of a union between church and
state is most likely to influence children of tender years,
whose experience is limited and whose beliefs consequently
are the function of environment as much as of free and vol-
untary choice. 08
Thus, the current state of law focuses on adolescents' suscep-
tibility to religious coercion in educational programs.
The Court acknowledged, in a footnote, 09 that the sta-
tus of those participating in a state-funded program is a valid
criterion in analyzing the constitutionality of such a program.
This footnote attempts to reconcile the Court's seemingly in-
consistent holdings in Marsh, Schempp, and Grand Rapids
(cases to be discussed below). In this effort at reconciliation,
the Court elaborates on the notion that mature citizens are
less susceptible to religious coercion. 1 Emphasis on differing
degrees of susceptibility to coercion justifies the differing
levels of scrutiny applied to programs involving impressiona-
ble and not-so-impressionable citizens. So, the Court's appli-
cation of differing degrees of establishment clause scrutiny
seemingly depends on citizens' various stages of development
in autonomy.
In Marsh v. Chambers"' the Court held that a state-
funded chaplain opening the Nebraska Legislature with a
prayer did not violate the establishment clause. Conversely,
in Abington School District v. Schempp"2 the Court held that
state-sponsored prayers opening the day in secondary and el-
ementary schools did violate the establishment clause." Jus-
108. Grand Rapids School District v. Ball 473 U.S. 373, 373 (1985).
109. Id. at 391 n.9.
110. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971).
111. 463 U.S. 785 (1983).
112. 374 U.S. 103 (1963).
113. This matter offers an illuminating revelation of the transforma-
tion of Justice Brennan's establishment clause jurisprudence. In Schempp,
Brennan, concurring, offered dicta to the effect that the Schempp holding
would not impact on certain practices, such as prayers in legislative chain-
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tice Brennan, writing for the majority in Grand Rapids, ac-
cepted the validity of the distinction between permissible
state-sponsored prayers for legislators and impermissible
state-sponsored prayers for secondary school children." 4 The
difference in the results of cases with similar facts lay in the
distinction between state legislators' maturity and secondary
school students' immaturity. Justice Brennan cited this dis-
tinction approvingly to illustrate the heightened sensitivity of
the Court's analysis of establishment clause issues that involve
impressionable children."'
Scholarly commentary has also recognized the pivotal
role a citizen's impressionability to coercion plays in the
Court's establishment clause analysis. John Noonan, Donald
Gianella, Rex Lee, and Leo Pfeffer all have recognized that a
citizen's immaturity and the accompanying susceptibility to
religious indoctrination pose deep establishment clause
problems in the eyes of the Court. 6 If a citizen's impression-
ability, or immaturity, lies at the core of the Court's establish-
ment clause analysis, it is important to examine how the
Court distinguishes between stages of development in auton-
omy, this note now turns to that inquiry.
The Supreme Court has articulated two divergent con-
bers. Twenty years later, in Marsh, Brennan faced that specific question of
prayers in legislative chambers. Surprisingly, and in the face of his concur-
rence in Schempp, he voted that the practice violated the establishment
clause: "Nevertheless, after much reflection, I have come to the conclusion
that I was wrong then and that the Court is wrong today." Marsh v. Cham-
bers, 463 U.S. 483, 796 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Interestingly, as far back as Schempp, Justice Brennan pointed to the ma-
turity of the participants as a distinguishing criterion in evaluating an es-
tablishment clause claim. See Abington School District v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 103, 209-10 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
114. Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985).
115. Id. This, by implication, also demonstrates why the Court has
been less cautious in their approach to establishment clause cases involving
less-than-impressionable youngsters (Tilton) and mature citizens (Marsh).
116. See supra notes 65 and 73, for Noonan's, Gianella's, and Pfef-
fer's comments.
For Former Solicitor General Rex Lee's comments, see Lee, The Religion
Clauses: Problems and Prospects, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 337.
Perhaps it is that public school teachers who come onto parochial
premises might themselves be the object of religious proselytizing.
But this notion is surely at odds not only with common experience
but also with the Court's own observations that it is the suscepti-
bility of children, not adults, to religious indoctrination that raises
establishment clause concern.
Id. at 344.
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ceptions of youngsters. 117 The first conception of youngsters,
as having primary autonomy, arises, as seen above, in cases of
state funding of religious elementary and secondary
schools. 18 The second conception of youngsters, as having
intermediate autonomy, dominates those cases involving a mi-
nor's decision to have an abortion ' and, as seen above, in
establishment clause cases involving college students. 20 If the
participants in AFLA have only primary autonomy, then the
Court may carefully consider the risk that these children will
be unduly indoctrinated."' If, however, the participants in
AFLA are seen as intermediately autonomous, there is per-
haps less danger than the Kendrick court admitted of those
participants being unduly influenced by religious influence. 22
117. "We have been reluctant to attempt to define the totality of the
relationship of the juvenile and the state." Carey v. Population Services
International, 431 U.S. 678, 692 (1977) (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,
13 (1967)).
118. E.g., Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985);
Aguilar v. Felton, 472 U.S. 402 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S.Ct. 2479
(1985); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
119. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (state cannot require pa-
rental or judicial consent for non-emergency abortions for minors);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (state may not force
minor to obtain parental consent for abortion within first twelve weeks of
pregnancy).
120. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) and more recently,
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (198"1) (holding that a state university
must offer equal access to religious groups who seek to make use of availa-
ble meeting rooms on campus).
The main point to be taken from Widmar is the majority's statement con-
cerning the autonomy of adolescents in the university setting: "University
students are, of course, young adults. They are less impressionable than younger
students and should be able to appreciate that the University's policy is one of
neutrality toward religion." Widmar, 454 U.S. at 272 n.14 (emphasis added).
121. Although Grand Rapids and Aguilar would apparently apply,
there is a well-grounded hesitation to apply them strictly. Since the chil-
dren will eventually become autonomous, it is incumbent upon their par-
ents-or, in the absence of parents, upon society-to inculcate basic values
and virtues. To fail to do so is an omission of the highest sort.
When children are seen as having emergent autonomy there exists a
greater basis for paternalistic intervention by the state. In other words,
there is a strong state interest in educating the children.
122. It would seem that the AFLA participants are more like those
students in Tilton, rather than those in Grand Rapids. Thus, it follows that
Tilton applies.
When children do not exhibit capacities for present autonomous action
and, at the same time, have the potential to develop eventually into fully
autonomous beings, the Court has safeguarded the children's potential for
autonomous development. In the establishment clause cases involving fi-
nancing to religious elementary and secondary schools, the Court has jeal-
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Three conclusions follow from seeing the children in
Kendrick as intermediately autonomous. First, the Court
should presumptively apply the Bellotti and Tilton rationales
to Kendrick insofar as the adolescents involved in both cases
display the same characteristics. Second, Congress can legiti-
mately offer education in sexual responsibility to adolescents,
consistent with those adolescents' intermediate stage of au-
tonomy. Third, Congress' decision to use religious and chari-
table groups is a constitutional and efficient means by which
to educate these adolescents and to respect the autonomous
nature of the youngsters.
As already noted, the Court's description of youngsters
with primary autonomy is sketched in the establishment
clause cases involving elementary and secondary schools. 2 '
Determining one's stage of autonomy springs from considera-
tions of two factors: age (physical and emotional) and the se-
riousness of the situation the person faces. Thus, a youngster
is primarily autonomous if she is emotionally young, or, more
importantly, if she faces only those situations faced by a
child.' These factors can be grouped into a single notion:
that the autonomy of the youngster springs from her psycho-
logical development and life experiences. Under this distinc-
tion, the adolescents in Kendrick surely have more than pri-
ously guarded the children's interests against the potential religious coer-
cion or indoctrination.
The difference between indoctrination and coercion and inculcation is as
follows: indoctrination is coercive insofar as it violates one's autonomy; in-
culcation aids one in his or her autonomous development. I will devote
more attention to this distinction later in this note. See generally van Geel,
The Prisoner's Dilemma And Education Policy, 3 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'y 301 (1988), especially at Section I-A. This implicates the impor-
tance of developing children into autonomous citizens. When the Court
has viewed children as having an underdeveloped or primary autonomy,
the Court has acted to protect children. See Grand Rapids School District
v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 n.9 (1985).
123. E.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), and its progeny.
This note will use the Court's most recent school funding case, Grand
Rapids, as illustrative of the Court's notion of primary autonomy. To avoid
redundancy, the discussion will focus only on those aspects of Grand Rapids
not yet evaluated in this note. (For the additional discussion of Grand
Rapids, see supra text accompanying notes 85-110.) Grand Rapids, as previ-
ously discussed, involved youngsters who were impressionable to coercion
and indoctrination.
124. On the other hand, a youngster could be seen as more than pri-
marily autonomous if she demonstrates she is emotionally and physically
mature or if she undertakes adult-like activities.
KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 181 (5th ed. 1984).
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mary autonomy: the emotional age and adult-like activities of
the adolescents in Kendrick indicate that they are more than
the mere children of Grand Rapids.12
In matters related to sexual conduct and in cases of state
funding to religious colleges, the Court has described adoles-
cents as more than the mere children of primary autonomy
in Grand Rapids and the previously discussed elementary and
secondary school cases. In particular, the Court has generally
seen youngsters seeking an abortion as intermediately auton-
omous. 26 It is argued here that the characteristic of interme-
diate autonomy may very well be correct in matters of sexual
education. This should be especially apparent to a Court
which has viewed-erroneously in light of the life and death
125. The adolescents in Kendrick faced far graver life experiences
(i.e., procreative decisions in the inner city) than the children in Grand
Rapids seeking remedial reading assistance. In Grand Rapids, the Court
based its characterization of the youngsters as impressionable on their age
(emotional and physical) and the circumstances they faced. The use of
chronological age as the dispositive factor is dangerous and inaccurate. Al-
though age and maturity are surely related, different individuals mature at
different times depending on their social and psychological circumstances.
Indeed, these social and psychological circumstanced may prove more reli-
able in arriving at the proper characterization of individual adolescents.
See, Note, Cognitus Interruptus: The Courts and Minors' Access to Contracep-
tives, 5 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 212, 223 (1986) (reviewing judicial decisions
on adolescents' procreative decisions both in the United States and Great
Britain).
The students in Grand Rapids are arguably dissimilar from the AFLA
participants in Kendrick. The two groups differ both in age (physically and
emotionally) and in circumstances. To base development in autonomy -
development in the capacity to be self-determining in a meaningful and
informed way - on mere physical age for all circumstances is troublesome.
Studies show that youngsters in this age group (10-12) lack the cognitive
capacity to make reasoned judgments. This evidence comes largely from
material cited in Wald, Children's Rights: A Framework for Analysis, 12 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 255, 274, n.71 (1979). See W. DAMON, THE SOCIAL WORLD OF
THE CHILD (1977). These children cannot think abstractly, not can they eas-
ily engage in long-term planning.
Although some research points to the period from 12 to 14 years old as
the beginning of adult moral development, sparse research exists on the
moral development and reasoning process of 12 to 14 year olds in refer-
ence to major questions like abortion. J. PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF
THE CHILD (1939). See C. Lewis, Three Studies of Adolescent Decision Mak-
ing (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford Univ. 1979), cited in Wald,
at 274 n.71.
126. A caveat: This note shall rely heavily on cases decided in the
wake of Roe v. Wade. These cases emphasize Roe's implications for a minor
seeking an abortion or contraceptives. This note makes no suggestion that
these cases are correct or, for that matter, internally consistent. Indeed,
these cases are deeply flawed, both legally and morally.
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consequences of an abortion decision-in that manner. Quite
simply, if the Court seriously believes that youngsters seeking abor-
tions are in such a stage of development so as to make a determina-
tion of life or death, then the youngsters in Kendrick must be ma-
ture enough to discern coercive attempts at indoctrination.
Intermediate autonomous adolescents display limited ra-
tionality and limited experience and judgment through which
to make partially informed decisions.12 8 As such, these adoles-
cents are not highly impressionable, yet, at the same time,
they need information and guidance. They are neither chil-
dren, who may be treated paternalistically, nor adults, who
can be completely left alone. The youngsters in Kendrick
seeking information on procreative matters possess these
characteristics.
The Court has seen youngsters as intermediately autono-
mous in procreative areas. 29 In Planned Parenthood v. Dan-
forth30 the Court defended a minor's right to make decisions
on having an abortion. In Danforth the Court overturned
Missouri's legislative decision to require the written consent
of a parent in order for a minor to undergo an abortion. " '
The Court reasoned that the consent violated a minor's right
of privacy.1 3 2 The Court saw the minor as neither child nor
127. Given this characterization, the Court should view the adoles-
cents in Kendrick as less susceptible to coercion and indoctrination.
128. This characterization results from a reading of both majority
and minority opinions in the cases discussed in the text. Of course, it is
highly anomalous that the Court imputes these characteristics to young-
sters in the context of making a life or death decision-namely, whether to
undergo an abortion.
129. See generally Note, Judicial Consent to Abort: Assessing a Minor's
Maturity, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 90 (1986).
130. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
131. Mo. REV. STAT. § 3(4) (1974).
132. This right was first recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), for married couples in the area of procreation, and Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 133 (1973), in the area of abortion. Both these cases in-
volved adults. Indeed, Dean Bruce Hafen of Brigham Young Law School
has noted that the special status of youngsters creates an obligation to care:
"The reality behind the concept of minority status is that children lack the
capacity to formulate reasoned judgments. Their inherent dependency cre-
ates an obvious need-indeed a "right"-to affirmative nurturing and spe-
cial forms of protection." Hafen, Exploring Test Cases in Child Advocacy
(Book Review), 100 HARV. L. REV. 435, 446 (1986).
This need suggests a general right of children to be protected
from their own immaturity. Of course each child requires gradu-
ally increasing freedom to make important choices, even at the
risk of harming himself through some bad judgments. The capac-
ity to weigh risks in making personal choices is only developed as
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adult. A plurality of the Court imputed to the minor the ca-
pacity to make her own rational determination for undergo-
ing an abortion, if that minor was "mature."13 Still, the
Court refused to characterize minors as full adults having un-
fettered power to make an abortion decision:
Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution
and possess constitutional rights.[cites] The Court indeed,
however, has long recognized that the State has somewhat
broader authority to regulate the activities of children than
of adults . . .184
Minors seeking an abortion in Danforth were more than mere
children, less than full adults.
In Carey v. Population Services International,'3 6 the Court
held that the state could not restrict a minor's freedom or
autonomy in sexual activity.' In striking down a New York
law prohibiting the sale of contraceptives to minors, the
Court relied on the "right of personal privacy"'3 7 as "one as-
pect of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the
children live with, and learn from, the unpleasant consequences of
their decision. For this reason, adolescence should be seen as a
time in which children are given low-risk levels of autonomy as a
way of learning how to assume greater responsibility. Still, in a
paradoxical but important sense, a child has a basic right to be
protected from complete freedom.
Id. at 446. Youngsters, as intermediately autonomous citizens, have special
needs.
133. The Court stated, "Our holding . . . does not suggest that
every minor, regardless of age or maturity, may give effective consent for
the termination of her pregnancy." Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 75 (1976).
134. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74-75 (citations omitted).
135. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
136. But Justice White rejected the radical libertarian view of young-
sters. In Carey, Justice White took issue with the majority's misguided em-
phasis on the rights and liberties of the mother, as opposed to the duties of
individuals and of society. "Even as early as Danforth the majority of the
Court saw the decision as the interests of the mother versus the interests of
the father: nothing said of the duties of either, duties of society, or interest
of the fetus." Carey, 431 U.S. at 104. As Justice White intimated, a com-
mitment to the rights of youngsters may actually hinder their autonomy.
The state cannot simply leave the youngster alone to exercise her rights;
positive liberty must exist in order for a youngster to be truly free. See I.
BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, FouR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1969). Both White
in Carey and Stevens in Danforth realized that the state should provide ado-
lescents with moral, personal and medical considerations so that the adoles-
cent could exercise freedom consistent with her autonomy.
137. 431 U.S. at 684.
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Fourteenth Amendment."13 8 The inherent gravity of the de-
cision to procreate finds strong constitutional protection.13 9
The Court, as in Danforth, purported to view these young-
sters as more than mere children, but did not confer on them
all the liberties of an adults.1 40 The youngsters were interme-
diately autonomous.
The Court offered an elaborate account of the interme-
diate autonomy of adolescents in Bellotti v. Baird."' Although
the result in Bellotti cannot be squared with its rationale, one
can glean from the case the Court's significant description of
youngsters. In Bellotti, the Court affirmed the Massachusetts
Supreme Court's invalidation of a statute regulating a mi-
nor's abortion decision. The Court held that a minor can
make serious decisions, yet the inherent dimensions of an
abortion decision allow that a state provide additional guid-
ance to guarantee a truly informed choice by the minor.""
The import of the Court's holding is evident: many young-
sters are mature enough to make an informed abortion deci-
sion, yet the state should provide educational information to
safeguard an informed decision.
In Bellotti, the Court presented a deep theoretical analy-
sis of the freedom, or autonomy, of youngsters. The Bellotti
138. Id.
139. The decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at
the very heart of this cluster of constitutionally protected
choices .... This is understandable, for in a field that by defini-
tion concerns the most intimate of human activities and relation-
ships, decisions whether to accomplish or to prevent conception
are among the most private and sensitive.
Id. at 685 (citations omitted).
140. In Danforth, Justice Stevens embarked on development of a
thoughtful jurisprudence in considering the autonomy of youngsters and
the duties society has to protect that autonomy. "The State's interest in the
welfare of its young citizens justifies a variety of protective measures. ...
The State's interest in protecting a young person from harm justifies the
imposition of restraints on his or her freedom even though comparable
restraints on adults would be constitutionally impermissible." Danforth, 428
U.S. at 102 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Justice Stevens recognized that the grave consequences of abortion deci-
sions give the state a strong interest in protecting the youngster. "But even
if it [the abortion] is the most important kind of decision a young person
may ever make, that assumption merely enhances the quality of the State's
interest in maximizing the probability that the decision be made correctly
with full understanding of the consequences of either alternative." Id. at
103 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
141. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
142. Id. at 635.
143. Id. at 642-43.
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rationale, not the result, sounds with the themes of intermedi-
ate autonomy. The Court gives special protection to young-
sters because of, inter alia,'" their "peculiar vulnerability,
[and] their inability to make critical decisions in an informed,
mature manner.'
'1 45
The vulnerability of adolescents places them in precari-
ous positions that may threaten deprivations of their lib-
erty.1 46 To safeguard the liberty of adolescents the state may
allow adjustments of a legal system's rules and regulations ac-
cordingly: "[t]he State is entitled to adjust its legal system to
account for children's vulnerability and their needs for 'con-
cern, . . . sympathy, and . . and parental attention.' ,,147 In
other words, the intermediate autonomy of youngsters war-
rants a legal system that conforms to their special status. The
legal system should both recognize that the adolescents are
not highly impressionable and at the same time that they are
not yet adults.
The Bellotti Court recognized that absolute freedom to
make a choice might in reality be no freedom at all. Chil-
dren's rights may pose great danger to children. 48 Confer-
ring freedom to make a choice without experience and judg-
ment does not respect autonomy. 49 Thus, the State may
144. "We have recognized three reasons justifying the conclusion
that the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of
adults: the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical
decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the pa-
rental role in child rearing." Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
145. Id. at 443.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 635 (quoting McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528,
550 (1971) (emphasis added).
148. Traditionally, the legal world has made an appeal to the rights
of youngsters, yet this approach may be inadequate to remedy their
situation.
Focusing the potential marketplace on the needs of children is a
difficult task. Children do not vote and do not make campaign
contributions. They are not network anchor people or opinion
makers. They are ineligible for public office, and they do not have
money of their own. They do not have access to the traditional
levels of political power.
Edelman and Weill, Status of Children in the 1980's, 17 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 139, 140 (1985). See also O'Neill, Children's Rights, Children's Lives, 98
ETHIcs 445, 459-63 (1988).
149. In order to make a meaningful choice, the patient (or the per-
son seeking an abortion) must have a certain level of understanding of the
procedure and its implications. Otherwise, the "choice" is no choice. See
generally J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984).
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constrict the range of freedoms for adolescents. The Bellotti
Court wrote:
States validly may limit the freedom -of children to choose
for themselves in the making of important, affirmative
choices with potentially serious consequences. These rulings
have been grounded in the recognition that, during the
formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often
lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and
avoid choices that could be detrimental to them. 60
Despite the Court's language concerning the limitations
of adolescents, the Court allows them to make a life or death
determinations on the question of abortion. The Court's ra-
tionale for this stark incongruency is unexplained and per-
haps unexplainable. The Court's feeble attempt at explana-
tion merely reasserts its belief that abortion is a fundamental
right. In the Court's words:
But we are concerned here with a constitutional right to
seek an abortion. The abortion decision differs in impor-
tant ways from other decisions that may be made during
minority . . . The pregnant minor's options in other situa-
tions are much different from those facing a minor in other
situations, such as deciding whether to marry . . . More-
over, the potentially severe detriment facing a pregnant wo-
man [cites] is not mitigated by her minority. 6
Thus, in the name of youngsters' rights, the Court appar-
ently endorses the notion that rights to make pregnancy deci-
sions supply some level of maturity. 6
Bellotti describes youngsters as less than full adults - as
vulnerable, needy beings of limited rationality without the
experience, perspective, and judgment to make a truly in-
formed choice.1 58 At the same time, Bellotti describes young-
150. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 636 (emphasis added).
151. Id. at 642.
152. There are deep problems with this emphasis on rights for ado-
lescents. See O'Neill Children's Rights, Children's Lives, 98 ETHICS 445 (1988)
and Hafen, Children's Liberation and the new Egalitarianism: Some Reserva-
tions About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights", 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 605.
O'Neill sees the "children rights" movement as political and ethical fail-
ures while Hafen sees the phenomena of children's rights as both legal and
ethical failures.
153. This import was substantiated in City of Akron v. Akron Repro-
ductive Services, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (where the Court struck down a city
law prohibiting doctors from performing abortions on a minor under fif-
teen years old without parental consent or a valid judicial decree, id. at
440. The law failed to pass constitutional muster insofar as it presumed
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sters as more than mere children: they have some decision-
making capacity. They can make abortion decisions. They
have some degree of freedom that must respected and nur-
tured by information and education.'" Youngsters seeking
an abortion are, according to Bellotti, more than mere chil-
dren, less than full adults. In constitutional terms, these
youngsters are not the mere children of Grand Rapids, but
rather the partially mature adolescents of Bellotti and Tilton.
These cases-Carey, Danforth, and Bellotti-make clear
the Court's conception of youngsters as intermediately auton-
omous beings with deep vulnerability and needs, yet capable
of becoming fully autonomous. 55 The Court has said that
that all pregnant children under 15 years old are too immature to make an
abortion decision. But a minor may give a truly informed "consent" after
appropriate counseling from a "qualified" person, the counseling is not ex-
posure to relevant medical facts, and the a qualified person is not necessa-
rily a doctor.) "The State's interest is in ensuring that the woman's consent
is informed and unpressured; the critical factor is whether she obtains the
necessary information and counseling from a qualified person, not the
identity of the person from whom she obtains it." Id. at 448 (footnote
omitted).
The accompanying footnote reads:
We do not suggest that appropriate counseling consists simply of
a recital of pertinent medical facts. On the contrary, it is clear that
the needs of parents for information and an opportunity to discuss
the abortion decision will vary considerably. It is not disputed that
individual counseling should be available for those persons who
desire or need it. See e.g., National Abortion Federation Standards
1 (1981)...; Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington
D.C. Inc., Guidelines for Operation, Maintenance and Evaluation
of First Trimester Outpatient Abortion Faculties 5 (1980). Such
an opportunity may be especially important for minors alienated
or separated from their parents. . . . Thus, for most patients,
mere provision of a printed statement of relevant information is
not counseling.
Id. at 448 n.38.
154. There can be little doubt that the State furthers a constitu-
tionally permissible end by encouraging an unmarried pregnant
minor to seek the help and advice of her parents in making the
very important decision whether or not to bear a child. That is a
grave decision, and a girl of tender years, under emotional stress,
may be ill-equipped to make it without mature advice and emo-
tional support.
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91 (1976) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
155. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923):
Without doubt, it [liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bod-
ily restraint [negative liberty] but also the right of the individual
to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to
acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
[Vol. 3
AUTONOMOUS ADOLESCENTS
these youngsters are mature enough to make a life or death
decision, if they are supplied with the proper information
and education. Under this rationale, it follows that young-
sters in Kendrick seeking an abortion or seeking information
on sexual activity" are mature enough to be "less impres-
sionable and less susceptible to religious indoctrination."187
IV. MORAL EDUCATION: AUTONOMY AND THE INCULCATION
OF SECULAR VIRTUE
Having suggested in the previous section that the young-
sters in Kendrick are intermediately autonomous, this note
now will examine how state-sponsored education in sexual re-
sponsibility best respects and actually advances adolescents'
development in autonomy. Understanding that the state has
undertaken an educatory function, 68 two issues need to be
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own con-
science, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men.
Id. at 399 (citations omitted).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 300z (1982).
157. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971).
158. The parents shall have primary responsibility for the develop-
ment of the child's morals. Traditionally parents have been entrusted with
the duties to inculcate morality in children. Prince v. Massachusetts, 312
U.S. 158 (1944).
The Court has treated this subject with special sensitivity. "The unique
role in our society of the family, the institution by which 'we inculcate and
pass down many of out most cherished values, moral and cultural,' (Moore
v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-504 (1977) (plurality opinion), requires
that constitutional principles be applied to the special needs of parents and
children." Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
The state also has the duty to provide moral education in justice in a
well-ordered society. "Moreover his moral education itself has been regu-
lated by the principles of right and justice to which he would consent in an
initial position in which we all have equal representation as moral persons."
J. RAwLS, supra note 17, at 515. This is acutely relevant in the absence of
parents. This duty is to provide moral education, as opposed to
indoctrination.
The "tone" of a school-the extent of its own inherent de-
cency-is the sum of its assembled humans' characters and not
something that exists by fiat. A decent person has dignity; to order
a person to be decent violates dignity. At best he can be per-
suaded, and the decency he ultimately exhibits will come from
within, from his own convictions.
T. SizER, HORACE'S COMPROMISE 125 (1984).
Members of society ought to support this education insofar as it strength-
ens the moral fiber of the community. "Nor can someone in a well-ordered
society object to the practices of moral instruction that inculcate a sense of
justice." J. RAWLS, supra note 17, at 515.
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addressed: can the state legitimately teach sexual responsibil-
ity and can the state utilize religious organizations in local
communities in order to offer this particular education. The
conclusions from these analyses must be not only ethically
justified but also constitutionally permitted.
Given the characterization of youngsters seeking infor-
mation on procreative matters as intermediately autonomous,
this note contends that the state can legitimately inculcate
sexual responsibility in intermediately autonomous adoles-
cents. This note also contends that the state may properly use
local religious groups as educationally effective and constitu-
tionally permissible means to accomplish this education.
A. Sexual Responsibility: A Civic Virtue Advancing Adolescent
Autonomy
In order for one to make use of one's freedom, one must
first understand what it is to be free and have a minimum of
basic goods by which to exercise one's freedom. 159 Indeed,
one can argue that in order to become autonomous citizens
capable of exercising their constitutional rights,160 youngsters
require that minimum necessary conditions be met by soci-
ety. 161 One must have access to information in order to be
self-determining. Thus, an adolescent's autonomous develop-
ment is tied to basic education.16
At the same time, basic education must not be unduly
159. Isaiah Berlin writes, "to offer political rights to men who are
half-naked, illiterate, underfed, and diseased is to mock their condition;
they need medical help or education before they can understand or make
use of their freedom." BERLIN, supra note 136, at 124 (emphasis added).
160. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 638. ("This affirmative process of teach-
ing, guiding, and inspiring by precept and example is essential to the
growth of young people into mature, socially responsible citizens.")
161. "By minimal economic security, or subsistence, I mean unpol-
luted air, unpolluted water, adequate food, adequate clothing, adequate
shelter, and minimal preventive public health care.... ".H. SHUE, BASIc
RIGHTs 23 (1980) (emphasis added).
162. Today, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws
and great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recog-
nition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It
is required in the performance of our most basic public responsi-
bilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation
of good citizenship. . . . In these days, it is doubtful that any child
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education.
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
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coercive. In order to respect youth's autonomy and to avoid
coercion or indoctrination, the state should engage in moral
education to the extent that the education respects and pro-
motes the youth's autonomy." 8 In this way, education is inex-
tricably tied to the autonomy of the individual and the auton-
omy of society.1' To advance autonomy, state-sponsored
moral education must not be coercive.' 5
The virtue of sexual responsibility is a valid civic virtue
insofar as it allows adolescents to become self-determining as
they grow older. Sexual responsibility is central to the devel-
opment of an adolescent's autonomy: in practical terms, ado-
lescent pregnancy often results in high-school drop outs, illit-
eracy, low birthweight babies, and abject poverty." Quite
simply, the emotional and physical hardships of promiscuity
and abortion severely curtail opportunities to make life
choices and to act as autonomous citizens.167
163. "Thus moral education is an education for autonomy." J.
RAWLS, supra note 17, at 516.
164. This definition recognizes the doctrinal underpinnings of our
constitutional republic by emphasizing the civic virtues of liberty, fairness,
due process, and privacy, as well as toleration of subversive speech and in-
dividual expression, and the fairness of the marketplace as civic virtues.
See generally van Geel, supra note 123. Professor van Geel argues that
students have the right and society has the duty to educate our youth sub-
versively. This education respects the moral autonomy of the student and
makes our educational system and society efficient and strong.
For a recent statement on the value of fairness in the market, see Mitsub-
ishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 651 (1985)
(where Justice Brennan points out "the extraordinary 'magnitude' of the
value choices made by Congress in enacting the Sherman Act").
Indeed, constitutional history is replete with examples of deep value
choices either made or condoned by the United States Supreme Court. See
generally Attanasio, Everyman's Constitutional Law: A Theory of the Power of
Judicial Review, 72 GEO. L.J. 1665 (1984).
165. This comports with Kant's formula of the End in Itself: "treat
humanity in your own person or in the person of any other never simply as
a means, but always at the same time as an end." I. KANT, supra note 17, at
429. From this Kant argues that one cannot act on maxims of deceit or of
coercion. Coercion and deceit, as action that would not be consented to,
would violate the autonomy of another. See generally O'Neill, Between Con-
senting Adults, 14 PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS 252 (1985).
166. Lewin, Fewer Teen Mothers, But More Are Unmarried, New York
Times, March 20, 1988, at E-26, col.l.
167. See generally Juhasz and Sonnenshein-Schneider, Adolescent Sexu-
ality: Values, Morality And Decision Making, 23 ADOLESCENCE 579 (1987) (re-
porting that immature adolescents lack intellectual power of autonomous
reasoning to dissuade themselves from engaging in sexual behavior);
Streetman, Contrasts In The Self-Esteem of Unwed Teenage Mothers, 22 ADo-
LESCMNCE 459 (1987) (reporting the effects on the self-esteem of an unwed
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Insofar as religious virtue and civic virtue may both de-
rive from the same historical roots and may both seek to ad-
vance the autonomy of their members,"' the coincidence of
the religious and the secular is inevitable at times. So, the
analysis must focus on whether the religious virtue is a valid
civic virtue that advances autonomy. A problem may arise
when education in civic virtue coincides with education of re-
ligious virtue. Some may object that the potential for reli-
gious indoctrination exists and that this coercive activity, if
allowed to occur, would violate the autonomy of young-
sters.16 9 The focus of this analysis must center on whether
teenage mother); Namerow, Lawton, and Philliber, Teenagers' Perceived And
Actual Probabilities of Pregnancy, 22 ADOLESCENCE 479 (1987) (reporting that
teenagers sexual behavior was more closely related to the perceived risk of
pregnancy than the actual risk of such). Most significant is Lowe & Radius,
Young Adults' Contraceptive Practices: An Investigation of Influences, 22 ADO-
LESCENCE 291 (1987) (reporting the dangerous lack of information on con-
traceptive practices for teens).
168. Religious virtue cannot be wholly eliminated from the inculca-
tion of civic virtue in the schools. Note, The Myth of Religious Neutrality By
Separation in Education, 71 VA. L. REV. 127, 166-68 (1985).
"Much acceptable American secular ethic is a direct extension of Judeo-
Christian teaching and cannot be detached from it, however hard the con-
stitutional lawyers may labor. Individualism, compassion, the sense of obli-
gation for service to one's community, and a belief in the literacy all have,
surprising as it may seem to some, religious roots." SizEt, supra note 158,
at 127. Of course, those values whose roots do not lie in Judeo-Christian
culture are also acceptable. "Nevertheless, the singular banishment of reli-
gious morality from political discourse does create serious problems. If reli-
gious morality can only be disguised as secular morality, then the implicit
message sent by law is that the former is less legitimate that the other."
Gedicks and Hendrix, Democracy, Autonomy, and Values: Some Thoughts on
Religion and Law in Modern America, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1579, 1598 (1987).
Indeed, much civic morality finds its inspiration in its religion's historical
roots.
The function of education, therefore, is to teach one to think
intensively and to think critically. But education which stops with
efficiency may prove the greatest menace to society. The most
dangerous criminal may be the man gifted with reason but with no
morals. . . . We must remember that intelligence is not enough,
intelligence plus character-that is the goal of true education.
M. KING, THE WORDS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING 41 (1983).
169. One must still distinguish between inculcation and indoctrina-
tion. To remain within the scope of this note, it suffices to remark that
inculcation represents those education activities that provide one with the
necessary information to make meaningful choices and to become self-de-
termining. Inculcation treats each individual as an end and not as a mere
means. Indoctrination, on the other hand, does not treat each individual as
an end, but rather as a mere means. Indoctrination imposes others' ends
on an individual.
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the activity is coercive. Religious involvement is not per se
coercive. Religious and secular notions need not be exclusive.
As long as the religious virtue comports with the definition of
civic virtue - that is, it advances autonomy and avoids coer-
cion - the coincidence ought not matter.1 0 To the extent
that a religious virtue promotes and respects autonomy, it is a
valid civic virtue.1 71
The Court has recognized that civic and religious virtues
can constitutionally co-exist as one value. In Harris v. Mc-
Rae, 72 the Court, in evaluating a challenge to the Hyde
Amendment that restricted federal funds for abortions, re-
jected the argument that the Hyde Amendment violated the
establishment clause because the Hyde Amendment incorpo-
rates Catholic doctrines concerning abortion and contracep-
tion. 1 The fact that Congress, in Harris endorsed "tradi-
tional values" that "happen to coincide or harmonize with
the tenets of some or all religions" does not violate the estab-
lishment clause. 174 Just as state and religious prohibitions
against murder result in advancing autonomy, so can state
and religious admonitions against promiscuity advance auton-
omy. Religious values and traditional cultural and political
values may be the same in communities.1 7 1
170. The Supreme Court has recognized that religious, moral, and
political principles will at times coincide, and the Court is applauded when
it acknowledges this. One commentator has proposed: "Nonetheless, when
widely shared religious systems do converge, the Court should take notice.
Because the followers of organized religion generally connect normative
systems to an omniscient Deity, the Court can either gain support by con-
curring with such systems where they converge or lose support by dissent-
ing." Attanasio, supra note 164, at 1719 (1984).
Another commentator has noted that the law's moral substance ema-
nates from religious foundations. "In the United States virtually all our
moral principles are rooted in our Judeo-Christian tradition, in which the
Bible is accepted as God's revealed word and the Ten Commandments as
His revealed law. If the belief that the killing of unborn children is morally
wrong cannot be the basis of public law because it is rooted in God's re-
vealed law, the same must be said of the belief in the immortality of mur-
der, theft, rape, child abuse, slander and every other practice condemned
in the Bible." Blum, Moral Foundations of American Democracy, 1 NOTRE
DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y. 65, 73 (1984).
171. See generally Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), pointing out
that religious disapproval against murder and robbery does not preclude
the state from penalizing the same activities.
172. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
173. Id. at 319.
174. Id. at 319, citing McGowen v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442
(1961).
175. Moral discourse is part of the judicial process.
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B. Religious Organizations as Secular Providers of Virtue
Assuming that the State can instruct youngsters in the
civic virtue of sexual responsibility even if that secular policy
coincides with religious belief, it remains to be seen whether
the state must preclude religious organizations from using
state funds to accomplish this instruction. In other words, do
local religious and charitable organizations provide appealing
avenues by which the state can implement social welfare pro-
grams, such as AFLA.
Since 1899, the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized
the propriety of religious groups participating in and ad-
ministering state-sponsored social welfare programs. In Brad-
field v. Roberts,1" 6 the Court unanimously validated a $30,000
Congressional grant to a hospital operated by the Roman
Catholic Church. The Court expressly rejected complaints
that the hospital's religious affiliation would alter the secular
program of providing treatment for the "sick and invalid.
1 7 7
It was inconsequential what organizations or what individuals
performed the secular task: their religious affiliation, inspira-
tion, or opinions were "not subject of inquiry. ' 17' 8 This view
has gained precedential value for educational programs
throughout the 20th century, as affirmed by the Court in
Roemer.179 The Court has properly sanctioned the State's be-
nign ties to religious organizations that pervade the most sig-
nificant of social welfare programs. 80
Constitutional law can make no genuine advance until it isolates
the problems of rights against the state and makes that problem
part of its own agenda. That argues for a fusion of constitutional
law and moral theory, a connection that, incredibly, has yet to
take place . . . . There is no need for lawyers to play a passive
role in the development of a theory of moral rights against the
state, however, any more than they have been passive in the devel-
opment of legal sociology and legal economics. They must recog-
nize that law is no more independent from philosophy than it is
from these other disciplines.
R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 149 (1977). Dworkin, of course, of-
fers a rights-based approach to moral theory. Nevertheless, his perceptions
on the impact of moral discourse on law are valid.
176. 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
177. Id. at 299, n.1, referring to 13 Stat.43 (April 8, 1864).
178. Id. at 298-299.
179. Roemer v. Maryland Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736
(1976).
180. See generally, Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and
Doctrinal Development Part II: The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 513 (1968).
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Congress' intent to use religious groups in social welfare
work stems from the efficiency and productivity of these or-
ganizations, as mediating structures,18 in social welfare con-
cerns. According to University of Chicago professor James
Coleman, religious organizations provide social capital by
which the government can efficiently achieve desired social
results for the poor and disadvantaged.18 2 Social capital, as
opposed to financial and human capital, is found in informal
community organizations. 18 This capital utilizes the "rela-
tions between persons."'" Religious organizations are impor-
tant forms of this social capital for education insofar as,
outside the student's family, religious organizations provide
support for youth in their educational endeavors. 8
Most significantly, exclusion of religious groups from
providing these educational services may disproportionately
harm poor youngsters since religious organizations provides so-
cial capital in those areas most affected by poverty.""
Whether the state's purpose has been to treat the sick, house
the homeless, feed the poor, or educate the uninformed, the
state has met its obligations through the local religious and
181. These are the intermediate organizations and associations
that stand between the individual and the state. They are typically
small, private entities such as the family, neighborhoods, churches,
and other voluntary associations that contribute toward the reali-
zation of "meaning, fulfillment, and personal identity" for the in-
dividual. The public sphere, by contrast, is dominated by the
"megastructures" of our mass national markets and by large gov-
ernment bureaucracies. The megastructures have enormous social
and economic influence, but they do not typically seek to tell us
the meaning of our individual lives.
Hafen, Institutional Autonomy In Public, Private, and Church-related Schools, 3
NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y. 405 (1988). See generally, P. BERGER
& R. NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE RotE OF MEDIATING STRUCTURES
IN PUBLIC POLICY (1977).
It is easy to see that AFLA organizations serve as a mediating structure;
herein lies the reason for their successes, as voiced by Senator Edward Ken-
nedy. See supra n.6.
182. See generally Coleman, The Creation and destruction of Social Capi-
tal: Implications for Law 3 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y. 375
(1988).
183. Informal in the sense that they are not government entities.
184. Id.
185. This support cannot be provided by Congress or by any other
government arm. This social capital is a public good insofar as it induces
youth to prosper in education and stay in school: it is easier for a local
religious education groups to convince a youth to remain in school than it
is for the United States Congress to do so. Id.
186. Id.
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charitable organizations who share the same concerns. To be-
gin a systematic exclusion of religious organizations from
these social welfare programs would in many cases leave the
poor unattended 187 or, worse yet, leave financially-strapped
social welfare programs in the hands of those who lack com-
mitment to the underlying values of the effort. Using the es-
tablishment clause to separate religious organizations from
the dispossessed directly exacerbates the plight of the poor.
CONCLUSION
The centerpiece of Judge Ritchie's decision in Kendrick
focuses on the state's subsidy of religious organizations'
teaching and counseling on virtues that both religion and the
state share.'8 8 This, he reasons, violates the Constitution:
Put plain, these functions amount to teaching by grant re-
cipients and subcontractors, including religious organiza-
tions, about the harm of premarital sexual relations and the
factors supporting a choice of adoption rather than abor-
tion, and these matters are fundamental elements of reli-
gious doctrine.'89
The judge perceived the commingling of civic and religious
interest in these concepts: "It is a fundamental tenet of many
religions that premarital sex and abortion are wrong, even
sinful."' 90 Thus, AFLA "contemplates subsidizing a funda-
mental religious mission of those organizations.''. This judi-
cial inquiry into the religious affiliation of organizations and
their members who perform state-sponsored secular tasks
187. For example, in caring for the homeless, religious groups aid
two to three million homeless people throughout the United States. In the
District of Columbia alone one Lutheran Church "houses, feeds, or coun-
sels," 50,000 people per year. Congress, in passing the Stewart B. McKin-
ney Homeless Assistance Act (P.L. No. 100-77, § 412, 101 Stat. 482, to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. 11372), specifically intended for religious groups not
to be excluded from federal monies in the groups' efforts to reach the
homeless. To emphasize this, Congress examined HUD's regulations ex-
cluding religious groups from funding and recommended that HUD revise
its regulations so as to include religious organizations in receiving federal
funds to provide secular services.
188. "[T]he court's decisions do reflect the concern that the state it-
self will become a vehicle for the inculcation of religious values." Develop-
ments, supra note 78, at 1686.
189. Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. 1547, 1562 (D.D.C. 1987).
190. Id. at 1563.
191. Id.
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demonstrates an unparalleled hostility to religious groups.1"1
This reasoning is flawed. It exemplifies modern confu-
sion over the state's authority to educate youngsters in civic
virtue. The state may educate youngsters to the extent that
education advances individual and societal autonomy, and
matters of sexual responsibility are legitimate civic virtues.
Insofar as Judge Ritchie admitted that AFLA had a valid sec-
ular purpose, 93 the coincidence with religious virtues should
not render AFLA unconstitutional on its face.
Once sexual responsibility is accepted as a civic virtue in
which the state may offer instruction, the Court should not
prohibit Congress from using any organization, including re-
ligious ones, from performing this secular task. The state's
use of religious organizations to help poor, mature young-
sters makes both constitutional and educational sense. This is
especially true where the risk of religious indoctrination is
minimal given the intermediate autonomy of the adolescents
who are the intended beneficiaries of the Act.
The state, in respecting the autonomy of its young citi-
zens, may use religious organizations to educate the country's
young and dispossessed. Use of these organizations finds justi-
fication both in the Constitution and in modern educational
and social theory. The Constitution and moral theory man-
date that Congress be allowed to use religious organizations
in reaching out to adolescents of this nation.9 The allure of
sending "a cleric, indeed a clerical order, to perform a wholly
secular task"' 95-in this case, to educate adolescents-finds
both constitutional and theoretical support.
ADDENDUM
After this note was written the Supreme Court decided
Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S.Ct. 2562 (1988). In a 5-4 decision,
the Court found that AFLA was facially constitutional. This
decision may signal a move towards a more rational establish-
ment clause jurisprudence, a body of law that allows the gov-
192. Brief for Appellant at 39, Bowen v. Kendrick, 657 F. Supp.
1547 (D.D.C. 1987) (no. 87-253).
193. See supra text at notes 26-32.
194. "Children have a very special place in life which law should re-
flect. Legal theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to falla-
cious reasoning if uncritically transferred to determination of a State's duty
toward children." May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
195. Roemer v. Maryland Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 746
(1976).
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ernment to use religious organizations to teach adolescents
on sensitive matters of concern to both the adolescents and to
the country. In this way, the law will advance the autonomy
of these adolescents.
